MEMO TO:
Alexsei Demo US
RESEARCH ID:
#40009015b8f97d
JURISDICTION:
Federal
STATE/FORUM:
Florida, United States of America
ANSWERED ON:
October 26, 2022
CLASSIFICATION:
Intellectual property

Issue:

Is a copyright registration valid if it contains inaccurate information?

Conclusion:

Omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid where there has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information. (St. Luke's Cataract and Laser Inst. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2009))

In order to invalidate a registration, the application must contain inaccuracies, the inaccuracies must be material, and the applicant must have the required scienter of intentional or purposeful concealment. (Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2017))

Materiality hinges on whether the Copyright Office would have refused the application if the inaccuracy were known. In order to aid in the determination of materiality, the district court must make an inquiry to the Copyright Office. (Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2017))

Scienter can be demonstrated through intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information on the part of the registration applicant. (Study Edge, LLC v. Skoolers Tutoring Ctr., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227915, 2018 WL 6492968 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2018))

For the purposes of invalidating a copyright registration, the law distinguishes between innocent mistakes and intentionally misleading mistakes. Where scienter is lacking, courts generally have upheld the copyright. (Study Edge, LLC v. Skoolers Tutoring Ctr., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227915, 2018 WL 6492968 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2018))

Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration. (Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P., 142 S.Ct. 941, 211 L.Ed.2d 586 (2022))

Law:

Subsection (b)(1) of 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2022) sets out:

§ 411. Registration and civil infringement actions

[...]

(b)

(1) A certificate of registration satisfies the requirements of this section and section 412, regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless-

(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and

(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.

In St. Luke's Cataract and Laser Inst. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid where there has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information (at 1201): 

A certificate of registration satisfies the registration requirement in § 411(a) "regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless ... (A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration." Id. § 411(b)(1). "[O]missions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid" where there has been "intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 828 (11th Cir.1982). Thus, there must be a showing of "scienter" in order to invalidate a copyright registration. Id. "In general, an error is immaterial if its discovery is not likely to have led the Copyright Office to refuse the application." Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161 (1st Cir.1994).

In this case, the appellant argued that the jury erred in finding that the appellant's first and second registrations were invalid and that the discrepancies in the registrations were clerical errors. However, the Court found that, based on the evidence, the jury could have inferred that the appellant knew there were parts of the website that were not original and intentionally misrepresented to the Copyright Office in its first application that it had a copyright to an entire version of the website. Similarly, the jury could have inferred that the appellant intended to mislead the Copyright Office in its second application by failing to disclose that it had registered a version of the website only a few months earlier that was 90 to 95 percent similar in content. The jury heard the trial testimony and had copies of both registrations and deposit copies in its deliberation. It was within the province of the jury to conclude that the appellant's characterization of the misrepresentations was not credible (at 1201-1203): 

St. Luke's argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying its motion for a new trial because the jury's finding that its First and Second Registrations were invalid was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree because

[573 F.3d 1202]

there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that St. Luke's made intentional, material misrepresentations in the First and Second Applications and the deposit copies it submitted to the Copyright Office.

The testimony from Bradley Houser, St. Luke's administrator and representative at trial, revealed that St. Luke's made numerous misrepresentations about authorship and originality on its copyright registration applications. For example, on the First Application, St. Luke's stated that it claimed a copyright over the entire February 15, 2003 version of the LaserSpecialist.com website. However, Houser admitted that the February 15, 2003 version of the LaserSpecialist.com website contained numerous things that were not original, such as stock photographs, Dr. Sanderson's thesis paper, and maps and directions that were obtained from the website mapquest.com. In fact, Houser still did not know which photographs were stock and which were original when he testified. Despite the many items whose originality was questionable, and others that clearly were obtained from other Internet sources, Houser indicated that St. Luke's did not make any inquiry to determine the source of these questionable items. More importantly, St. Luke's did not disclose in its First Application that it was unsure whether some of the information on the website was original or from third parties. Rather, St. Luke's represented that the "[e]ntire website" was created by St. Luke's.

The deposit copy submitted with the First Application revealed further misrepresentations. Houser admitted that the deposit copy contained a page on Cymetra injections that was added to the LaserSpecialist.com website after Dr. Sanderson resigned from St. Luke's and was not on the website on February 15, 2003. In addition, Houser acknowledged that the date on several pages of the deposit copy showed that they appeared on the LaserSpecialist.com website before February 15, 2003. Nevertheless, St. Luke's represented to the Copyright Office in its First Application that the date of the first publication of the work being registered was February 15, 2003. The date of the first publication is highly relevant because it affects whether the five-year presumption of validity applies.

The Second Application also contained material misrepresentations. For example, St. Luke's responded "No" to the question on the copyright registration form asking, "Has registration for this work, or for an earlier version of this work, already been made in the Copyright Office?" St. Luke's provided this answer even though 90 to 95 percent of the content on the June 9, 2000 version of the LaserSpecialist.com website was the same as the February 15, 2003 version covered by the First Registration. At trial, defense counsel showed Houser both versions of the website, and Houser testified that they were "substantially similar." Defense counsel asked Houser, "So, it's true, isn't it, that St. Luke's has registered two copies of the same website that are fundamentally the same but said that they are—one is a February 15th, 2003 version and the other is a June 9th, 2000 version, correct?" Houser responded, "Yes." Even though St. Luke's acknowledges the overwhelming similarities between the June 9, 2000 and February 15, 2003 versions, it failed to advise the Copyright Office of the First Registration when asked if registration for "this work" already had been made. While there were some differences between the two registered versions of the LaserSpecialist.com website, the jury was free to decide as a question of fact whether these were fundamentally the same versions of the website and whether it was a material omission for

[573 F.3d 1203]

St. Luke's not to disclose that it had registered substantially the same version of the website several months earlier.

St. Luke's characterizes these discrepancies as "clerical errors" and contends that there was no evidence that any misrepresentation or omission in the First and Second Applications or the deposit copies was intentional or purposeful. However, the jury could have inferred such intent from the evidence discussed above. As to the First Registration, the jury could have inferred that St. Luke's knew that there were parts of the LaserSpecialist.com website that were not original and intentionally misrepresented to the Copyright Office in its First Application that it had a copyright to the entire February 15, 2003 version of the LaserSpecialist.com website.22 Similarly, the jury could have inferred that St. Luke's intended to mislead the Copyright Office in its Second Application by failing to disclose that it had registered a version of the LaserSpecialist.com website only a few months earlier that was 90 to 95 percent similar in content. The jury heard the trial testimony and had copies of both registrations and deposit copies in its deliberation. It was within the province of the jury to conclude that Houser's characterization of the misrepresentations was not credible.

In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying St. Luke's motion for a new trial.23

In Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2017), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) codifies the defense of fraud on the Copyright Office. In order to invalidate a registration, the application must contain inaccuracies, the inaccuracies must be material, and the applicant must have the required scienter of intentional or purposeful concealment. Materiality hinges on whether the Copyright Office would have refused the application if the inaccuracy were known. In order to aid in the determination of materiality, the district court must make an inquiry to the Copyright Office (at 1029-1030): 

17 U.S.C. § 411(b). This statute, which Congress modified in 2008, codifies the defense of Fraud on the Copyright Office.5 Appellees assert that the 2008 amendment to the Copyright Act "precludes reading ‘fraud’ into the statute," see Appellees Br. at 20, and they averred at oral argument that the 2008 amendment served as a ‘sea change’ in copyright policy that superseded this Court's precedent (even though the amendment was enacted between the Original Appalachian and St. Luke's decisions). They are wrong. This Court's analysis in St. Luke's directly cites to the post-2008 amendment statutory language and reaffirmed the finding from Original Appalachian that the "intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information" is required to invalidate a copyright registration. See St. Luke's, 573 F.3d at 1201.

Materiality hinges on whether the Copyright Office would have refused the application if the inaccuracy were known. See id. In order to aid in the determination of materiality, the district court must make an inquiry to the Copyright Office. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2).

On the other hand, the scienter necessary for invalidating a registration is also clear and well settled. See Original Appalachian, 684 F.2d at 828 ("While ... omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid, a common element among them has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information. Where this element of ‘scienter’ is lacking, courts generally have upheld the copyright.");

[877 F.3d 1030]

Donald Frederick Evans, 785 F.2d at 904; St. Luke's, 573 F.3d at 1201 ("Omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid where there has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information. Thus, there must be a showing of scienter in order to invalidate a copyright registration.") (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, in order to invalidate a registration, (1) the application must contain inaccuracies, (2) the inaccuracies must be material, and (3) the applicant must have the required scienter of intentional or purposeful concealment. While the district court correctly found material inaccuracies in the registrations, it erred by not applying the appropriate scienter for Fraud on the Copyright Office.

In this case, the Court found that the errors in each of the registrations were made in good faith. Based on the types of errors made, there was no motive for deception. Thus, while the inaccuracies were not insignificant, none appeared to have been made with the scienter necessary for invalidating a registration. Accordingly, the Court found that the district court erred in its application of the law and that a proper application of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) would have led to a conclusion that the registrations were valid (at 1030): 

Rappers are skilled in poetry and rhythm—not necessarily in proper copyright registration procedures. While error is not generally a strong legal argument, it is a sufficient counter to a claim of Fraud on the Copyright Office. This is not a case where Rapper A attended a Rapper B concert, heard a delightful song, stole the composition, and fraudulently registered it with the Copyright Office—far from it. There is no dispute by any party that Appellants authored and created Hustlin', and there is no dispute that they continue to receive the writers' share of royalties from their musical composition. Furthermore, Appellees never proffered any argument or theory as to why Appellants would attempt to deceive the Copyright Office, when they are, in fact, the undisputed authors.

As indicated by the absence of any sort of motive for deception, the errors made in each of the registrations were done in good faith. As portions of the ownership interest were acquired by record companies, those companies—incorrectly, but in good faith—filed for a new registration to protect their newly acquired interests presumably under the assumption that no previous registration had been filed.

The failure of the first registration to correctly assert a published work on the basis of promotional phonorecords provided to disc jockeys—as opposed to an unpublished work that was still awaiting album publication—lacks any sort of deceptive intent, especially since there is nothing to indicate that the registration would not have been approved as a published work. Furthermore, nothing of substance could be gained by listing the incorrect creation date of 2006 instead of 2005 on the latter two registrations. Considering that the album publication occurred in 2006, it seems that an understandable—albeit incorrect—definition of publication persisted in the second and third registration.

While all of these inaccuracies are not insignificant given the Copyright Office's response, none appear to have been made with the scienter necessary for invalidating a registration as outlined in Original Appalachian and St. Luke's. The district court thus erred in its application of the law. A proper application of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) under the framework of Original Appalachian and St. Luke's would have yielded the result of validity of registration—albeit plural registrations.

And while "[a]s a general rule only one copyright registration can be made for the same version of a particular work," specific exceptions are recognized by a federal regulation. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(11). In addition to these three exceptions contained in a federal regulation, logic would dictate that Original Appalachian and St. Luke's would support at least one more—a good faith, redundant registration for a published work.

In Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P., 142 S.Ct. 941, 211 L.Ed.2d 586 (2022), the United States Supreme Court found that 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. Therefore, the Court held that lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration (at 945):

Naturally, the information provided on the application for registration should be accurate. Nevertheless, the Copyright Act provides a safe harbor. It says that a certificate of registration is valid

"regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless—

"(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate ; and

"(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration." § 411(b)(1) (emphasis added).

The important point for our purposes is that a certificate of registration is valid even though it contains inaccurate information, as long as the copyright holder lacked "knowledge that it was inaccurate." § 411(b)(1)(A).

The question before us concerns the scope of the phrase "with knowledge that it was inaccurate." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit believed that a copyright holder cannot benefit from the safe harbor and save its copyright registration from invalidation if its lack of knowledge stems from a failure to understand the law rather than a failure to understand the facts. In our view, however, § 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding.

The Court explained that it followed the text of the statute and noted that both caselaw and the dictionary state that "knowledge" has historically meant and still means the fact or condition of being aware of something. Therefore, the Court reasoned that if the petitioner was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered the information in its application inaccurate, it did not include that information in its application with knowledge that it was inaccurate. The Court found that nothing in the statutory language of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) suggested that this conclusion should be any different simply because there was a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake of fact (at 946-947): 

Our reasons are straightforward. For one thing, we follow the text of the statute. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010). Section 411(b)(1) says that Unicolors’ registration is valid "regardless of whether the [registration] certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless ... the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate." Both case law and the dictionary tell us that "knowledge" has historically "meant and still means ‘the fact or condition of being aware of something.’

[142 S.Ct. 947]

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. ––––, ––––, 140 S.Ct. 768, 776, 206 L.Ed.2d 103 (2020) (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 888 (8th ed. 2004); New Oxford American Dictionary 938 (def. 2) (2d ed. 2005); Webster's New College Dictionary 625 (3d ed. 2008).

Unicolors says that, when it submitted its registration application, it was not aware (as the Ninth Circuit would later hold) that the 31 designs it was registering together did not satisfy the "single unit of publication" requirement. If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered the information in its application inaccurate, it did not include that information in its application "with knowledge that it was inaccurate." § 411(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Nothing in the statutory language suggests that this straightforward conclusion should be any different simply because there was a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake of fact.

The Court also noted that other provisions of the Copyright Act suggested that if Congress had intended to impose a scienter standard other than actual knowledge, it would have said so explicitly. The absence of such language in 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) tended to confirm the Court's conclusion that Congress intended "knowledge" to bear its ordinary meaning (at 947): 

Other provisions of the Copyright Act confirm that, in this context, the word "knowledge" means actual, subjective awareness of both the facts and the law. Those provisions suggest that if Congress had intended to impose a scienter standard other than actual knowledge, it would have said so explicitly. Seee.g., § 121A(a) (safe harbor for entities that "did not know or have reasonable grounds to know" that exported works would be used by ineligible persons); § 512(c)(1)(A) (safe harbor for internet service providers who are not actually aware of infringing activities on their systems and are "not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent"); § 901(a)(8) (" ‘notice of protection’ " requires "actual knowledge ... or reasonable grounds to believe" that a "work is protected"); § 1202(b) (civil remedies for certain acts performed by a person who knows or has "reasonable grounds to know" that he or she was facilitating infringement); § 1401(c)(6)(C)(ii) (for purposes of paragraph regarding the "[u]nauthorized use of pre-1972 sound recordings," "knowing" includes one who "has actual knowledge," "acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information," or "acts in grossly negligent disregard of the truth or falsity of the information"). The absence of similar language in the statutory provision before us tends to confirm our conclusion that Congress intended "knowledge" here to bear its ordinary meaning. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009).

In the unpublished decision of Study Edge, LLC v. Skoolers Tutoring Ctr., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227915, 2018 WL 6492968 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2018), the defendant argued that the plaintiff's copyright was invalid because it contained material inaccuracies that were known at the time of registration. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida explained that for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1), scienter can be demonstrated through intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information on the part of the registration applicant (at 7-8): 

Skoolers, however, can parry that presumption of validity by showing that the registration (1) contains inaccuracies; (2) the inaccuracies are material; and (3) Study Edge, through its representatives, had knowledge of those inaccuracies. Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2017). Material inaccuracies are those that would have caused the Copyright Office to reject the application. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(B). Courts must seek the advice of the Register of Copyrights in determining whether the Copyright Office would have rejected the application in light of the inaccuracy. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2). The third factor is often known as the scienter requirement and can be demonstrated through "intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information" on the part of the registration applicant. St. Luke's Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Skoolers dodges and weaves Study Edge's infringement claim by arguing that the '159 Copyright is invalid. The copyright, Skoolers claims, contains material inaccuracies that were known at the time of registration. [*8]  Therefore, invalidity must follow. This Court addresses each Gordy factor below.

The Court explained that for the purposes of invalidating a copyright registration, the law distinguishes between innocent mistakes and intentionally misleading mistakes. Where scienter is lacking, courts generally have upheld the copyright. In this case, the Court found that the petitioner's managing member knew that an author did not create the works for the petitioner as a work made for hire and that this was an intentionally added and critical inaccuracy on the copyright registration. Accordingly, the Court held that no reasonable jury could conclude that the petitioner did not know of at least some of the copyright inaccuracies (at 18-21): 

No reasonable jury can conclude that Study Edge—through its managing member, Fieldman—did not know of at least some of the '159 Copyright's inaccuracies.

For the purposes of invalidating a copyright registration, the law distinguishes between innocent mistakes and intentionally misleading mistakes. "While . . . omissions or misrepresentations in a copyright application can render the registration invalid, a common element among them has been intentional or purposeful concealment of relevant information. Where this element of 'scienter' is lacking, courts generally have upheld the copyright." Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1982).

While a reasonable jury could conclude that Fieldman believed Rees was the sole author of the ECO2023 materials at the time of the copyright registration, no reasonable jury can conclude that Fieldman believed Rees created the ECO2023 materials as a work made for hire at Study Edge. Accordingly, Study Edge knowingly submitted at least one inaccuracy on the '159 Copyright.

Fieldman [*19]  believed Rees alone created these works. While no reasonable jury can come to that conclusion as a factual matter, see supra, at 8-11, the inquiry at this stage of the Gordy test is Fieldman's knowledge. "I can tell you that I know Graham [Rees] was tasked with taking over a course and redoing it from scratch," Fieldman testified about the microeconomics course. ECF No. 36, at 114. Fieldman has also said "[a]t the time that the ECO 2023 Materials were presented to the Copyright Office to obtain a copyright registration, I believed that Mr. Rees had prepared them from scratch." ECF No. 48-1, at ¶ 14. These statements, among others, are sufficient to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to Fieldman's knowledge of the derivative nature of the ECO2023.

But the end-of-the-round bell hasn't rung yet. By characterizing the ECO2023 materials as a work made for hire Study Edge knowingly submitted falsehoods on its registration. Simply put, there was no way the ECO2023 materials were "a work prepared by [Rees] within the scope of his . . . employment" at Study Edge because he first created his portions of the materials long before Study Edge existed. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Fieldman knew that Rees created these works before [*20]  coming to Study Edge. His own words are clear. The materials "were developed by Graham Rees who brought them over to Study Edge . . ." ECF No. 36, at 74 (emphasis added); see also id. at 108 ("Q: You testified I believe on direct exam that the materials that were created at TZI went with Mr. Rees to Study Edge? A: Correct."). These statements indicate the existence of materials at the time Rees moved from TZI to Study Edge. Moreover, Rees "was directed to prepare the ECO 2023 materials from scratch" while he "was working with TZI as an independent contractor at the time." ECF No. 48-1, at ¶ 13 (emphasis added). Rees, in his own words, developed those materials "[b]y 2006," five years before Study Edge existed. ECF No. 25-1, at ¶ 7. The phrase "by 2006" suggests at least some degree of completion or finality.

On top of this, Fieldman worked at both TZI and Study Edge as a co-owner or managing member. At TZI, Fieldman supervised Rees. Fieldman explained that Rees "was directed to prepare the ECO 2023 Materials from scratch" while both men were working at TZI. ECF No. 48-1, at ¶ 13 (emphasis added). That Rees was directed to prepare the materials designates someone else did the directing and, at [*21]  the very minimum, knowledge on the part of Fieldman—who, notably, "owned and operated" TZI at the time. Id.

What is more, Fieldman explained that at TZI "Matt [Hintze] and I hired Graham Rees to kind of reinvent essentially the [ECO2023] course and be in charge of this course." ECF No. 36, at 53. Fieldman hired and directed Rees to "reinvent" the ECO2023 course at TZI—not Study Edge.

Fieldman is not an ostrich. No reasonable jury can conclude that Fieldman stuck his head in the sand and did not know what Rees was directed to create, where, and when. Fieldman supervised Rees at TZI while Rees created the ECO2023 materials—and hired him for the express purpose of "reinvent[ing] essentially the course." Id. Rees was not a work for hire for Study Edge and Fieldman knew Rees did not create the works for Study Edge as a work made for hire. This is an intentionally added and critical inaccuracy on the '159 Copyright.

However, the Court did not issue an entry of final judgment because it was still awaiting a response from the Copyright Office regarding the materiality of the inaccuracies in the copyright (at 23): 

The gloves have been off between Study Edge and Skoolers for some time. But the conclusion of this match must wait. This Court does not issue an entry of final judgment until it has received and reviewed a response from the Register of Copyrights on the second Gordy prong, relating to the materiality of Study Edge's inaccuracies on the '159 Copyright. Stay tuned.

Authorities:
17 U.S.C. § 411 (2022)
St. Luke's Cataract and Laser Inst. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2009)
Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 2017)
Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P., 142 S.Ct. 941, 211 L.Ed.2d 586 (2022)
Study Edge, LLC v. Skoolers Tutoring Ctr., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227915, 2018 WL 6492968 (N.D. Fla. May 7, 2018)