Can an aider and abettor be held vicariously liable for a crime committed by a confederate?

" 'Generally, if a statute is intended to impose a derivative liability on some person other than the actor, there must be some legislative direction that it is to be applied to persons who do not themselves commit the proscribed act. Such a direction is found in [Penal Code] section 31 which fixes responsibility on an aider and abettor for a crime personally committed by a confederate. But the statute which defines aiders and abettors as principals in the commission of a criminal offense does not also purport to impose additional derivative punishment grounded on an accomplice's personal conduct, as those statutes which provide for such increased punishment " 'do not define a crime or offense but relate to the penalty to be imposed under certain circumstances.' " [Citations.] Hence the rules which make an accused derivatively liable for a crime which he does not personally commit, do not at the same time impose a derivatively increased punishment by reason of the manner in which a confederate commits the crime.' " (People v. Laster, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, quoting People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 240-242, 133 Cal.Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306.)

However, the court also concluded that "there is no absolute rule against vicarious or

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