How has the limitation period been interpreted in family law cases?

Boland J. said in her endorsement that all facts related to the alleged tort were pleaded by the plaintiffs prior to the expiry of the limitation period set out in s. 60(4) of the Family Law Reform Act. This was the first factor mentioned in Basarsky v. Quinlan. With the greatest respect to the learned motions court judge, she was clearly in error in this regard. The first pleading was the statement of claim, which was not delivered until September, 1982, more than three and one-half years after the accident, and one and one-half years after the expiration of the two-year limitation period.

Is the absence of any formal pleading fatal to the father's submission that special circumstances within the meaning of Basarsky v. Quinlan exist in the present case? I think not, if there was some evidence in the record on which the learned motions court judge could find that the defendants, or their insurer, knew the facts relating to the claim now sought to be added, and that the claim would probably be made.