What is the limitation period under s. 60 of the Family Law Reform Act?

For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the limitation period under the Family Law Reform Act should have been extended under s. 2(5) of that Act, and would have been extended by the learned motions court judge in this case, if she had been asked to do so. The preferable practice would have been for the father to apply for such extension concurrently with his application for leave to be added for the purposes of asserting a claim under s. 60 of the Family Law Reform Act, but I do not think his failure to do so is critical in this case. The application under s. 2(5) could still be brought. In my judgment, the fact that an applicant for leave to be added as a party plaintiff for the purposes of asserting a claim under s. 60 of the Family Law Reform Act has obtained, or could have obtained, an extension of the two-year limitation period under s. 60(4) of the Act is at least an extremely important factor, if not a conclusive factor, to be considered in deciding whether special circumstances exist within the meaning of Basarsky v. Quinlan which would justify the court in permitting the amendment notwithstanding the expiration of a limitation period of equal length under another statute.