When will a court accept uncharged conduct evidence in the context of other sex abuse cases?

We are aware that trial courts should consider the "availability of less prejudicial alternatives" before admitting uncharged conduct evidence in the context of other crimes evidence. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182 (Falsetta ). ) Such alternatives might include admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant and inflammatory details surrounding the offense. (Ibid. ) However, that rule is driven by the policy disfavoring propensity evidence. (Id. at pp. 915916, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182.) Defendant cites no authority requiring the trial court to come up with evidentiary alternatives on its own in the context presented here and we decline to read such a requirement into section 352.