What is the test for abuse of discretion in the context of a motion to review the decision of a trial court denying a defendant's motion to exclude victim impact evidence and uncharged misconduct in the case of Romero?

We review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) "In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ' "[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review." ' [Citations.] Second, a ' "decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.' " ' [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Id. at pp. 376-377.)

Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's Romero motion. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a court may not consider victim impact evidence or uncharged misconduct in the Romero context. The authorities he does cite are not analogous. Defendant cites United States v. Watts (1997) 519 U.S. 148, 157 [136 L.Ed.2d 554], where the court held a sentencing court may rely

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