What is the test for a jury to find a defendant guilty as a principal in the commission of murder?

As reflected in our prior nonpublished decision, the jury in this case could have found defendant guilty as a principal in the commission of murder (either as a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor), or the jury could have found him guilty only as an aider and abettor or conspirator under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Garcia, supra, A126353, at pp. 11-12.) If the jury proceeded under the latter theory, the

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jury could have found defendant guilty of murder under the old law notwithstanding the fact that he did not harbor the intent to kill or act with reckless indifference to life. As we explained, based on the old law, " '[a]ider and abettor culpability . . . for a nontarget, or unintended, offense committed in the course of committing a target offense has a different theoretical underpinning than aiding and abetting a target crime. Aider and abettor culpability for the target offense is based upon the intent of the aider and abettor to assist the direct perpetrator [to] commit the target offense. By its very nature, aider and abettor culpability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not premised upon the intention of the aider and abettor to commit the nontarget offense because the nontarget offense was not intended at all. It imposes vicarious liability for any offense committed by the direct perpetrator that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. [Citation.] Because the nontarget offense is unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense is irrelevant and culpability is imposed simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime." (People v. Garcia, supra, A126353, at p. 12, italics added.)