What is the standard of review of questions of law and findings of fact?

The standard of review of the pure questions of law is correctness. As to the findings of fact, the standard of review is expressed in Douglas v. Milross, 2007 BCSC 1040 at para. 20:

The standard of review for palpable and overriding error was described by the majority in Housen v. Nikolaisen at [paragraph] 12 and [paragraph] 22: [paragraph] 12 The standard of review for findings of fact is such that they cannot be reversed unless the trial judge has made a "palpable and overriding error". A palpable error is one that is plainly seen. ... The same degree of deference must be paid to inferences of fact, since many of the reasons for showing deference to the factual findings of the trial judge apply equally to all factual conclusions. The standard of review for inferences of fact is not to verify that the inference can reasonably be supported by the findings of fact of the trial judge, but whether the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in coming to a factual conclusion based on accepted facts, a stricter standard. Making a factual conclusion of any kind is inextricably linked with assigning weight to evidence, and thus attracts a deferential standard of review. If there is no palpable and overriding error with respect to the underlying facts that the trial judge relies on to draw the inference, then it is only where the inference-drawing process itself is palpably in error that an appellate court can interfere with the factual conclusion. [...] [paragraph] 22 Although we agree that it is open to an appellate court to find that an inference of fact made by the trial judge is clearly wrong, we would add the caution that where evidence exists to support this inference, an appellate court will be hard pressed to find a palpable and overriding error. As stated above, trial courts are in an advantageous position when it comes to assessing and weighing vast quantities of evidence. In making a factual inference, the trial judge must sift through the relevant facts, decide on their weight, and draw a factual conclusion. Thus, where evidence exists which supports his conclusion, interference with this conclusion entails interference with the weight assigned by the trial judge to the pieces of evidence.