Is a finding of fact by a judge sitting alone a different standard of review than that by a jury?

The appellants contend that findings of fact of this type made by a judge sitting alone should be subjected to a different standard of review than those made by a jury. Their argument is that, because juries represent the public point of view, their interpretation of the plain meaning of words, where no evidence can be led to explain them, should be given deference by appellate courts; however, as one judge sitting as a trier of fact cannot be considered to have any better means of identifying what the public would take from the words complained of than the three judges on an appellate court, those appellate judges should have the opportunity to review the words complained of as evidence de novo. In my view, this argument is flawed in that it goes against a basic principle of appellate courts, one best expressed by McEachern C.J.B.C. in Leith v. Stockdill, 2000 BCCA 263 at para. 3: