Can an interlocutory order be used to determine fair and equitable consideration?

Morden A.C.J.O rejected this argument. At p. 100 O.R., after citing the passage from Hendrickson v. Kallio set out above, he said: In one sense, it can be said that the order in question does not determine "the real matter in dispute between the parties" (which is the right of the moving parties to be paid fair and equitable consideration by the responding parties and, if so, its amount, or, something less than this, whether the condition precedent to commencing an arbitration proceeding has been met). I do not think, however, that, in the circumstances, the order is interlocutory. I read the passage from Hendrickson v. Kallio as referring to "the real matter in dispute between the parties" in the proceeding which is before the court and not in some other proceeding which may, or may not, then be in existence. In accordance with this interpretation, I read "the litigation" in "the very subject matter of the litigation" as referring to the proceeding in which the order in question is made. Similarly, I read "the case" in "if the merits of the case remain to be determined" as also referring to the proceeding in which the order is made. (Emphasis in original)