Does the discoverability rule apply to non-incestual assaults?

In B.(K.L.), Esson J.A. observed in respect of M.(K.) v. M.(H.): The precise extent to which the decision will apply to the somewhat different allegations made by these plaintiffs, should only be determined when they can be related to a concrete set of facts. For instance, La Forest J. enunciated at pp. 48 and ff. a presumption that the nexus between the victim's injuries and incest will be discovered only after the victim receives therapy. Whether that aspect of the decision will apply to non-incestual assaults is not clear. What is clear is that the court found that the discoverability principle should be applied generally to cases of abuse against children. La Forest J. stated this conclusion at p. 35: In my view the only sensible application of the discoverability rule in a case such as this is one that establishes a prerequisite that the plaintiff have a substantial awareness of the harm and its likely cause before the limitations period begins to toll. It is at the moment when the incest victim discovers the connection between the harm she has suffered and her childhood history that her cause of action crystallizes. Reading the judgment as a whole, it becomes clear that the principle was not intended to be limited to incest. The decision in M.(K.) v. M.(H.), supra, may be seen as adding a new element to the discoverability rule. In Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, supra, and in Central Trust v. Rafuse, [1986 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147], it was found that the plaintiff had no knowledge of one element of the cause of action, i.e., damage. M.(K.) v. M.(H.) appears to hold that, even if the plaintiff had some knowledge of both the wrongdoing and the harm, the cause of action crystallized only when she discovers the causal relationship between the two. [paras. 22-23; emphasis added.]