What is the impact of s. 15 of the Charter on the definition of marriage?

After briefly reviewing the historical basis of marriage, Mr. Justice Blair turned to a view of what marriage is today. He linked the relevance of that discussion to a s. 15 analysis at paras. 60-61 of his reasons: If the courts are to examine the common law definition of marriage through the prism of Charter rights and values, it seems to me they must recognize and appreciate the changes that have occurred over the centuries, and more rapidly in recent years, in the attitudes of society towards the family, marriage and relationships, as outlined above. To do otherwise is to abandon the purpose of s. 15 — which is to promote equality and prevent discrimination arising from such ills as stereotyping, prejudice and historical wrongs — and to fail to consider the common law principle under review in a contextual fashion. As noted already, the Courts are mandated to take a purposive and contextual approach to the analysis and interpretation of s. 15 equality rights: Law v. Ontario (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra. Given this background and dramatically shifting attitudes towards marriage and the family, I have a great deal of difficulty accepting that heterosexual procreation is such a compelling and central aspect of marriage in 21st century post-Charter Canadian society that it — and it alone — gives marriage its defining characteristic and justifies the exclusion of same-sex couples from that institution. It is, of course, the only characteristic with which such couples are unable to conform (and even that inability is changing).