How have the courts interpreted the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights?

The argument in this connection is based primarily upon the dissenting judgment of Laskin, J. (now C.J.C.) in Regina v. Burnshine (1974) 1974 CanLII 150 (SCC), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505 where he says at page 520: “It is important to appreciate that the Canadian Bill of Rights does not invariably command a declaration of in-operability of any federal legislation affected by its terms. That may be the result, under the principle enunciated in the Drybones case, supra, if a construction and application compatible with the Canadian Bill of Rights cannot reasonably be found. The primary injunction of the Bill, however, is to determine whether a challenged measure is open to a compatible construction that would enable it to remain an effective enactment. If the process of construction in the light of the Bill yields this result, it is unnecessary and, indeed, it would be an abuse of judicial power to sterilize the federal measure.”