What is the new, more stringent screening threshold for reducing an offender’s parole ineligibility period?

Those observations were made by Pomerance J. in her pre-screening ruling in Jenkins on the constitutional validity of applying the new, more stringent screening threshold in cases in which the sentence was imposed prior to, and often many years prior to, the enactment of the new threshold. After upholding the constitutional validity of such retrospective application, she then went on to do the screening of the application. In R v. Jenkins, 2014 ONSC 3394 following paragraph 14, she made these further comments on the threshold provision, with which I am in general agreement. a. A substantial likelihood of success is a more stringent standard than a reasonable prospect of success, though it is difficult to concretely define the difference between the two; b. In applying the standard, the judge must take into account that, while screening is based on a paper review, the jury will be presented with oral testimony, which tends to be more evocative than documentary evidence; c. The judge must consider the broad discretion of the jury to grant clemency. The jury is to consider the five statutory criteria, but is not to apply any specific legal standard in assessing whether the period parole ineligibility should be reduced; … d. Under the old “reasonable prospect” test, the question was whether there was some evidence on which a reasonable jury could properly reduce the offender’s parole ineligibility period. Under the new test, the question is whether there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, acting judiciously, would be substantially likely to reduce the offender’s parole ineligibility period.