Is aiding and abetting a specific intent crime?

Appellant's argument centers on the assertion that aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime. Appellant argues that since aiding and abetting refers to a defendant's intent to do an act or achieve an additional consequence than merely the description of a particular act, i.e., that there is an intent to do a further act or achieve a further consequence, the crime is one of specific intent. (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456-457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370.)

Respondent simply counters to all of these contentions that appellant is mistaken in asserting that aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime since it is "not a crime at all, it is a theory of vicarious liability." Respondent cites People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392, and People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1046, 1049, fn. 8, 265 Cal.Rptr. 486.