Is a jury's instruction that a crime requires specific intent not specific intent invalidating a defendant's due process under the US Constitution?

"The due process clause 'protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' [Citations.] Because due process principles require the prosecution to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, jury 'instructions completely removing the issue of intent from the jury's consideration may constitute a denial of federal due process.' [Citation.] Conflicting intent instructionswhere one instruction requires the prosecution to prove intent while another instruction eliminates that requirementcan operate the same way. [Citation.] Accordingly, '[i]f conflicting instructions on the mental state element of an alleged offense can act to remove that element from the jury's consideration, the instructions constitute a denial of federal due process . . . .' [Citation.] This is so even where the court's instructions on the offense itself correctly explain the required intent, because we have 'no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict.' [Citations.]" (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1164-1165 (Valenti).) In this case, we need not determine whether the instructions "effectively 'removed the mental state element' from the jury's consideration," because even if the conflicting instructions amounted to a failure to instruct on an element of the offense, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 1165; see People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 314 [trial court's mistaken instruction that a crime required general, not specific, intent is federal constitutional error].)

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