How have courts interpreted Section F of the Three Strikes Act?

In our view, the inclusion of the words "shall" and "unless" in subdivision (f) does not create a presumption favoring a second strike sentence; the syntax merely reinforces that a trial court is vested with discretion to determine whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger based on the totality of the circumstances presented in a particular case. We reject defendant's argument that resentencing under the Reform Act is the converse of a Romero determination, and defendant's contention that the Reform Act evinces a preference for resentencing to a second-strike term. We further reject defendant's argument that the trial court should have considered the fiscal ramifications of his continued incarceration in the dangerousness calculation. Although saving money was a stated goal of the Reform Act, the primary purpose of both the Three Strikes law and the Reform Act is to protect public safety. (People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1036-1037.) The electorate already conducted a cost-benefit analysis by determining that those inmates whose resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety should not be released.

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Defendant argues that the denial of his resentencing petition was an abuse of discretion because substantial evidence does not support the trial court's dangerousness determination. "A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence." (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.)