How have courts interpreted the meaning of section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) of the three strikes law?

Finally, we take into account the rule of lenity. "'That rule generally requires that "ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation. But ... 'that rule applies "only if two reasonable interpretations of the statute stand in relative equipoise." [Citation.]' [Citations.]" [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'The rule of lenity does not apply every time there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal statute. [Citation.] Rather, the rule applies "'only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.'" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 611.) "Further, ambiguities are not interpreted in the defendant's favor if such an interpretation would provide an absurd result, or a result inconsistent with apparent legislative intent. [Citation.]" (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 783.)

An examination of the statutory scheme as a whole supports the conclusion the phrase "[d]uring the commission of the current offense, the defendant ... was armed with a firearm," as used in sections 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii), and as disqualifies an inmate from resentencing pursuant to section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), extends to situations in which the defendant was convicted of violating section 12021 but also had the firearm he or she was convicted of possessing available for use, either offensively or defensively. The purpose of the three strikes law has been variously stated as being "'to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses'" (In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 909) and "to promote the state's compelling interest in the protection of public safety and in punishing recidivism" (People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070). Although the Act

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"diluted" the three strikes law somewhat (People v. Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 167), "[e]nhancing public safety was a key purpose of the Act" (id. at p. 175).

In enacting section 1170.126 as part of Proposition 36, the issue before the voters was not whether a defendant could or should be punished more harshly for a particular aspect of his or her offense, but whether, having already been found to warrant an indeterminate life sentence as a third strike offender, he or she should now be eligible for a lesser term. By including as a disqualifying factor an inmate's mere intent, during commission of the current offense, to cause great bodily injury to another person, the electorate signaled its own intent that disqualifying conduct not be limited to what is specifically punishable as an enhancement. Apparently recognizing the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteruis the expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852) voters rendered ineligible for resentencing not only narrowly drawn categories of third strike offenders who committed particular, specified offenses or types of offenses, but also broadly inclusive categories of offenders who, during commission of their crimes and regardless of those crimes' basic statutory elements used a firearm, were armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another person.