How have courts interpreted section 20022 of the Workers' Comp Act?

Where, as here, the text itself is inconclusive in revealing legislative intent, we probe statutory context. Various principles guide our interpretation in this realm. Relevant to this case is the principle that statutes in pari materia--upon the same matter--are to be construed together and harmonized to avoid nullification of one statute by another. (Simonini v. Passalacqua (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 400, 404, 225 Cal.Rptr. 588.) Subdivisions [23 Cal.App.4th 203] (a)(6) and (b)(6) were separately enacted, but they relate to a single subject and should be read in tandem to effectuate the overall legislative scheme in defining PERL compensation.

The trial court reached a disharmonious interpretation of section 20022, limiting subdivision (b)(6) to employer-paid contributions that do not qualify under Internal Revenue Code section 414(h)(2). The effect of that resolution is to make earlier enacted subdivision (b)(6) a nullity, since PERS does not administer unqualified retirement plans and there is no tax or other financial advantage to making unqualified contributions. While a latter-enacted law takes precedence over an earlier, irreconcilable law, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be found if the laws can be harmonized on any rational basis. (Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7, 128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449.)