How have the courts interpreted section 28(d) and section 28 (f) of the Criminal Code in determining credibility of a witness?

To the extent that the provisions of section 28(d) and section 28(f) are uncertain, the analysis submitted to the electorate may be used to determine the intent of the framers. (Carter v. Seaboard Finance

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The majority cites People v. Montgomery (1971) 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, in support of the proposition that the introduction of a felony conviction into evidence may damage the credibility of the defendant-witness in the eyes of the jury, even where the conviction is for a crime not related to truth telling. CALJIC 2.23, which was given in this case, instructs the jury that, "The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the credibility of that witness. The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the witness' credibility. It is one of the circumstances that you may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a witness." If a defendant who testifies has suffered a conviction unrelated to truth telling (here, arson) and that fact is presented to the jury, it can be argued by defense counsel in closing argument that this fact bears not at all on credibility. The jury instruction and the opportunity for argument reduce any likelihood that irreparable damage is done by virtue of admitting into evidence the prior conviction.