How have courts interpreted "likely" in the context of aggravated assault?

The trial court instructed the jury on aggravated assault in the language of CALCRIM No. 875. Part of that instruction told the jury that to prove the crime, the People had to prove "[t]he force used was likely to produce great bodily injury." In this context, the term "likely" means " ' "probable or . . . more probable than not." ' " (People v. Russell (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776, 787.) Noting that "likely" can have other meanings, defendant contends the trial court had a duty sua sponte to define "likely" and erred to failing to do so. Defendant did not request amplification or clarification of this instruction at trial.

"The rules governing a trial court's obligation to give jury instructions without request by either party are well established. 'Even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law that are . . . necessary to the jury's understanding of the case.' [Citations.] That obligation comes into play when a statutory term 'does not have a plain, unambiguous meaning,' has a 'particular and restricted meaning' [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citations]." (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.)