How have courts interpreted "Fear" in the context of sexual assault cases?

" 'Fear' may be inferred from the circumstances despite even superficially contrary testimony of the victim." (People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 857 [rape victim "froze" during incident and robbery in the facts that the victim acquiesced

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promptly and gave up the money, actions people generally would not take absent fear of bodily injury if they refuse. The court explained, "In spite of the bravado of the merchant in declaring that he was not much afraid, we are inclined to believe he meant he was not afraid of receiving bodily harm so long as he complied with the demands of the robber." (Id. at p. 485.) Similarly, in People v. Renteria (1964) 61 Cal.2d 497, 498, a liquor store clerk who was robbed at gunpoint while his employer was in the store testified that he did not "have any fear of" the robber. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence of fear, finding it unreasonable to suppose the clerk would have given the employer's money to a stranger if he had not feared injury to himself or his employer would result from refusing and interpreting the clerk's " 'bravado' " testimony as meaning he was not afraid because he believed no harm would occur if he complied with the robber. (Id. at p. 499.)