Does the Attorney General's argument that section 12022.5 imposes three separate firearm penalties for a single assault is inconsistent with the apparent objective of the statute?

'The Attorney General's thesis, invoking three separate firearm penalties for a single occasion of firearm use, is inconsistent with the apparent objective of section 12022.5. A special deterrence against firearm use is its objective. The legislative theory is deterrence, whose power augments with each successive occasion. If the threat of a minimum five-year extension has failed to deter the first occasion of gun use, a second occasion may be deterred by doubling the threat, a third by tripling it. Thus the statute envisions a single application of deterrent force for each occasion, hopefully to deter gun use on a future occasion. Where, as here, a single judgment imposes sentences for several crimes committed upon a single occasion, only one finding under section 12022.5 is permissible.' (People v. Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d 1, 11--12, 112 Cal.Rptr. 834, 840.)