Can a jury consider evidence of intoxication only in deciding whether appellant intended to do the act required?

Appellant now contends that the trial court's version of CALCRIM No. 3426 was legally incorrect because it "told jurors to consider evidence of voluntary intoxication only in deciding whether appellant intended to do the act required, a general intent concept."⁵ Voluntary intoxication, however, is relevant on whether a defendant formed a required specific intent; it is not relevant to a general intent crime. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1125.) Appellant contends the issue is properly before this court despite his failure to object to the instruction below. But if the issue is deemed waived, appellant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent contends the trial court's instruction was legally correct, and argues that, when read in context, it "clearly refer[red] to the specific intent of the target crimes charged in counts 1 through 3, on which jurors were properly instructed elsewhere." (Fn. omitted.)