How has the jury considered evidence of intoxication in determining whether a defendant acted with malice in a second-degree murder case?

Moreover, the jury was adequately and properly instructed regarding the law on murder, manslaughter, and the applicability of evidence of intoxication. As noted, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 625, which properly advised them that they were to consider evidence of defendant's intoxication "in deciding whether defendant acted with an intent to kill." The court also instructed the jury as to second-degree murder with CALCRIM No. 520, including the requirements for express and implied malice, and as to voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense with CALCRIM No. 571. We presume the jurors understood and followed these instructions (see People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 871), and properly considered defendant's statement that he was intoxicated in determining whether he possessed the malice required for murder.

We also reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor's statements regarding intoxication left the jury with the impression they could not consider that issue as relevant to defendant's claim of imperfect self-defense. To some extent, the jury's consideration of intoxication as relevant to malice would overlap with the question of whether defendant acted in imperfect self-defense. (See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951 ["[I]mperfect self-defense 'obviates malice because that most culpable of mental states "cannot coexist" with an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one's own death or serious injury at the victim's hand.' [Citation.]"]; People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 [heat of passion and imperfect self-defense are "'theories of partial exculpation' that reduce murder to manslaughter by negating the element of malice.

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