When will a jury accept evidence of a defendant's prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol?

Moreover, the trial court did not admit evidence of the details of defendant's prior conviction beyond the fact of conviction, and the evidence presented did not consume an undue amount of time. Additionally, contrary to defendant's argument, we cannot conclude the prosecutor exacerbated any alleged prejudicial effect from the evidence's admission; he did not argue the jury should consider defendant's prior DUI as evidence of defendant's propensity to drive under the influence but rather referenced this prior conviction in discussing defendant's explanation for his flight from the scene of the accident. (Cf. People v. Hendrix, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 251.)

Accordingly, we cannot conclude it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to defendant if evidence of defendant's prior conviction for driving under the influence was excluded. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227 ["we have held the application of ordinary rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the 'reasonable probability' standard of Watson"].) We also cannot conclude defendant has satisfied the high constitutional standard to show the admission of evidence of his prior conviction deprived him of a fair trial and was so prejudicial as to render the trial "fundamentally unfair."