Can a defendant be prejudiced by admitting evidence of a prior conviction for driving under the influence?

Even assuming, arguendo, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior conviction for driving under the influence, we cannot conclude defendant was prejudiced. The jury was given a limiting instruction regarding the use of the conviction. It was instructed that such evidence could only be used as evidence related to consciousness of guilt and not for the purpose of determining defendant's actions on the date of the accident. We presume the jury followed this instruction. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574; see also People v. Hendrix (2015) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 247 ["A limiting instruction can ameliorate [Evidence Code] section 352 prejudice by eliminating the danger the jury could consider the evidence for an improper purpose"].) Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher, undermining a conclusion that it used defendant's prior conviction to establish his conduct on the date of the offense with regard to all of the charged offenses. And, unlike in People v. Hendrix upon which defendant relies, the jury was not instructed it should consider the similarity between the prior uncharged offense and the charged offense without being instructed on how such similarity should be considered. (Id. at pp. 247-248 [given instruction was "confusing" and, in light of irrelevant and inflammatory evidence, was not presumably followed].)