What is the test for determining whether a plaintiff's conduct is excusable as a result of provocation?

Appellant asserts that his conduct was excusable as a result of provocation. In People v. Taylor, 197 Cal.App.2d 372, 380-381, 17 Cal.Rptr. 233, 237, it is said:

'To be sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter, the heat of passion must be such as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinary, reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, or in the mind of a person of ordinary self-control. (People v. Brubaker, 53 Cal.2d 37, 44, 346 P.2d 8.) The primary question in determining whether homicide is voluntary manslaughter is whether the [211 Cal.App.2d 197] defendant's reason was, the time of his act, disturbed or obscured by some passion to such an extent as would render an ordinary man of average disposition likely to act rashly or without due deliberation

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'Furthermore, before a homicide may be classified as voluntary manslaughter, it must appear that there was no 'cooling' period, that is, after the 'heat of passion' was reasonably and justifiedly engendered, 'hot blood had not had time to cool' before the fatal act was committed, that is, the act that engendered the 'hot blood' had occurred so shortly before the killing that reason had not had time 'to resume its empire.' (People v. Wells, 10 Cal.2d 610, 618, 76 P.2d 493, 499.)