What is the test for "abuse of discretion" in the context of international comity?

^[6] See United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that "abuse of discretion" is a "distinctive term of art that is not meant as a derogatory statement about the district judge whose decision is found wanting").

^[7] As explained below, see Section III.A n.8, infra, we understand international comity to apply here as a form of prescriptive comity: "a canon of [statutory] construction" that may serve to "shorten the reach of a statute." In re Picard, Tr., 917 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other contexts, international comity functions instead as a type of "adjudicative comity," "the so-called comity among courts," which "may be viewed as a discretionary act of deference by a national court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly adjudicated in a foreign state." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even were we to consider this case under the rubric of adjudicative comity-which principally applies when a district court has declined to exercise jurisdiction in deference to ongoing proceedings in a foreign court- we would in any event review that decision under an unusually rigorous abuse-of-discretion standard that leaves "little practical distinction between review for abuse of discretion and review de novo." Id. at 102 (quoting Hachamovitch v. DeBuono, 159 F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1998)).