If a minor was a minor at the time of the sexual abuse, what is the impact of Section 2G2.2 of the Child Abuse Guideline on the sentence of a convicted child abuser?

of the underlying sexual abuse. See 18 U.S.C. 5037(c). This misperceives the purpose of the enhancement, which is not to punish prior conduct but to assess the risk of recidivism and potential harm. See United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d at 222-23. Accordingly, that Filippi was a minor at the time of the past pattern of abuse may be a mitigating factor, but it is "not relevant to [the] Guideline's applicability." Id. at 224-25 (emphasis added). In sum, because the enhancement does not necessarily place the sentence outside the "range of permissible decisions," United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted), we identify no substantive error in the district court's application of the Guideline here.

No different conclusion is compelled by United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010), which instructs courts to apply 2G2.2 enhancements with care to avoid unreasonable results. The district court acknowledged this obligation in explaining its specific Guideline application and its decision to grant a considerable downward variance.

United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017), is also inapt. In holding a sentence substantively unreasonable, the court's conclusion that 2G2.2 could not "bear the weight assigned it" was based largely on the absence of any allegations that the defendant "used peer-to-peer file sharing software, distributed images, or participated in chat rooms devoted to child pornography," or that he engaged in any "sexually dangerous behavior" apart from the crimes of conviction. Id. at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, Filippi did use such software and had previously sexually abused his stepsister over a period of years.

Page 5