What is the test for a jury to convict defendant under section 803 of the California Code of Civil Procedure?

As explained above, Tejada's interpretation of the jury instructions does not follow from the language of the instructions. Tejada misleadingly quotes the record, omitting language that expressly instructed the jury that the evidence of uncharged offenses was not sufficient by itself to prove the rape charge. Tejada also ignores the very next sentence of the instruction, which told the jury the prosecution must still prove the rape charge beyond a reasonable doubt. No reasonable jury would have understood these instructions to mean what Tejada asserts they meant. In any event, as the Attorney General points out, Tejada made no objection below on any of these grounds. He has thereby forfeited the claim. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 236 [ex post facto claim was forfeited by failure to raise the claim below].)

For the reasons above, we find this claim without merit.

Tejada contends section 803, together with the trial court's instructions on it, violated his due process rights because they allowed the jury to convict him under a clear and convincing burden rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Attorney General points out, California courts have squarely rejected this claim. (People v. Linder (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 75, 82-85 [statute of limitations is not an element of the offense and its extension does not result in an increase in punishment]; People v. Riskin (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 234, 240-241 [facts required to extend statute of limitations do not define an element of the offense and do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt].) Tejada acknowledges those cases but disagrees with their analyses and holdings. We agree with their holdings, and Tejada cites no authority that might persuade us otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude this claim is without merit.

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