What is the state of the law in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion?

Conwell's responsive arguments are often confused and disjointed and are replete with unsupported and irrelevant assertions of both fact and law. In essence he appears to be arguing that the first prong of the test under section 425.16 cannot be established because (1) the parties and issues are not the same in this action as in Ding v. Luca; (2) legal malpractice actions are not connected with a public issue or issue of public interest; (3) his lawsuit "does not chill any defendant's right to answer the complaint or exercise their other rights of free speech or petition of grievance"; and (4) for a defendant's act to be in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech he or she must be "presently engaged in furtherance of those rights or reasonably in anticipation of exercising the right of petition or free speech."

None of these assertions is supported by any applicable authority, nor does he purport to cite any. The first appears to be an extrapolation from res judicata principles. The second -- even if it were legally accurate -- is of no consequence, since this is not a legal malpractice case. The third assertion is likewise misguided, because there is no requirement that the lawsuit actually have a chilling effect for the statute to apply. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 75; Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016.) Finally, there is no support whatsoever for Conwell's assumption that the defendant must be presently engaged in petition or speech rights when the plaintiff files the lawsuit.

Conwell cites California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032 without explanation of its applicability to the present case. There is none. There the appellant attorney, after representing the injured parties in a personal injury action, disbursed the proceeds without notifying the holders of liens on the action or withholding funds to satisfy those liens. In the lienholders' subsequent lawsuit against the appellant, his anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied because the complaint was

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