What is the standard for "heat of passion" in a murder case?

murder to manslaughter must be of the kind that would cause "an ordinary person of average disposition [to] kill." (Id. at p. 949.) Instead the court reiterated a rule promulgated in a venerable case, People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, "the fundamental 'inquiry is whether or not the defendant's reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion . . . to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.'" (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 938-939.) Thus, the focus of "heat of passion" is not on whether the person of average disposition would kill, but rather whether such a person would be "liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection." (Id. at p. 939.) And "[a]dopting a standard requiring such provocation that the ordinary person of average disposition would be moved to kill focuses on the wrong thing. The proper focus is placed on the defendant's state of mind, not on his particular act." (Id. at p. 949.)