What is the impact of restricting a County's freedom to choose a hearing officer?

Next, the County contends that any benefit to the adjudicative process that might come from restricting its freedom to choose hearing officers would not justify the increased burden on the County. The County thus invokes the cost-benefit analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (Mathews), in which the high court wrote that the "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including

[119 Cal.Rptr.2d 356]

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."

[119 Cal.Rptr.2d 356]