Does the exclusionary rule apply in a revocation hearing where a police officer or parole officer has conducted an illegal search?

The Attorney General asserts that this conclusion is inconsistent with the high court's decision in Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (Scott). There, the court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings where police officers or parole officers conduct an illegal search. (Id. at pp. 362-369, 118 S.Ct. 2014.) Specifically, the Attorney General quotes the following passage in the court's opinion: "Parole agents, in contrast to police officers, are not `engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' [citation]; instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees should remain free on parole. Thus, their relationship with parolees is more supervisory than adversarial. [Citation.] It is thus `unfair to assume that the parole officer bears hostility against the parolee that destroys his neutrality; realistically the failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his supervising officer.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 368, 118 S.Ct. 2014.)