What is the impact of a prosecutor's statement that a third man aider and abettor must intend to facilitate a crime?

But we find "no reasonable likelihood any juror would have applied the prosecutor's comments erroneously." (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 93.) In the bank robbery example preceding this statement, the prosecutor described the hypothetical third man aider and abettor as someone who helped formulate the plan

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for the robbery, thereby having advance knowledge of the plan. Further, the prosecutor correctly read from the jury instructions that an aider and abettor must intend to facilitate a crime prior to or during its commission. The court had correctly instructed the jury in the same terms and had further instructed the jurors to disregard the attorneys' comments if they conflicted with the court's instructions on the law. Under these circumstances, we assume the jurors understood that their instructions on the law came from the court, not the attorneys (People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 703) and we conclude that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law was harmless. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 661.) This isolated misstatement amidst other correct statements by the prosecutor does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional error.