What is the difference between a majority and a majority in making a general obligation bond financing decision?

We do not think respondents have demonstrated that bond-finance decisions are fundamentally different from many other political decisions made by a majority vote or by representatives elected by a majority vote. Even assuming, however that respondents had done so we think their argument fails at another level. This justification for the extraordinary majority requirement rests on the premise that a decision to Undertake a project such as the construction of schools and playgrounds is qualitatively different from a decision Not to do so. This, in turn, is based on the assumption that spending money is a more serious matter than not spending it and, consequently, must be justified whereas frugality is self-justifying. A predisposition to thrift may serve a man well. It does not, however, justify governmental inertia, especially when government is faced with critical social problems demanding urgent and sometimes costly remedies. There is no presumption in favor of inaction, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Avery v. Midland County, Supra, 390 U.S. 474, 484, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 1120: '(W)e might point out that a decision not to exercise a function within (local government's) power--a decision, for example, not to build an airport or a library, or not to participate in the federal food stamp program--is just as much a decision affecting all citizens * * * as an affirmative decision.'

In sum, we do not believe that the nature of general obligation bond financing warrants diluting the votes of those who want action, in order to institutionalize a preference for the interests of those who want stasis. (Hunter v. Erickson, Supra, 393 U.S. 385, 392--393, 89 S.Ct. 557.) ⁵³