What is the current state of the law on a motion to suppress a statement under the Miranda rights?

And we'll write it down." Appellant contends that, by these remarks, the police "in substance . . . told appellant that he should trust the police, not his lawyer, and that if appellant did not talk to them he would never again have the opportunity to tell his side of the story." But counsel cannot deprive a defendant of his right to testify at trial. (People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 ["the right to testify in one's own behalf is of such fundamental importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury"].)

"The inquiry [into whether appellant waived his right to counsel and to remain silent] has two distinct dimensions. [Citations.] First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421.)

The standard of review is de novo: "An appellate court applies the independent or de novo standard of review, which by its nature is nondeferential, to a trial court's granting or denial of a motion to suppress a statement under Miranda insofar as the trial court's underlying decision entails a measurement of the facts against the law." (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690,

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730.) "After independent review, we believe that the [trial] court did not err in denying [appellant's] motion." (Ibid.)