What is the current state of the law in the context of the Miranda Miranda safeguards?

For purposes of Miranda, custodial interrogation involves "a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) In other words, Miranda safeguards are required only where the suspect is interrogated, that is, subjected to "words or actions ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

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It follows that not all statements obtained by the police from a suspect who is incarcerated or otherwise confined are the product of interrogation. Nothing in Miranda is intended to prevent, impede, or discourage a guilty person, even one already confined, from freely admitting his crimes, whether the confession relates to matters for which he is already in police custody or to some other offense. As Miranda itself recognized, "[c]onfessions [are] a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment" or subject to the prophylactic requirements of Miranda. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1630, fn. omitted; accord, Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.)