What is the appropriate sentence for a convicted burglar with a history of violent crime?

At appellant's sentencing hearing, the trial court opined that an appropriate punishment for his crimes would be a prison term of 15 years to [63 Cal.App.4th 863] life, but acknowledged that the three strikes law requires a sentence of either 25 years to life or 50 years to life. The court deemed the possible sentence of 50 years to life "absurd in this case" to the extent that it "would be cruel and unusual punishment." The court struck the three strikes findings as to counts 1, 2 and 7, but imposed a three strikes sentence of 25 years to life as to count 6. In striking the strikes as to three of the counts, the court noted that in appellant's three prior burglary offenses he "did not use the weapons [taken in the burglary] in any defensive way" during his arrest, appellant "has been very cooperative since arrested on this case [and] has been of some help to the police on other matters," and "there is no violence involved in any of his crimes [though appellant] is a very large man and probably fairly strong and probably is capable of violence if he were so inclined." The trial court specifically stated it struck the strikes as to three of the four counts pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628, and Penal Code section 1385.

On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court failed to exercise informed discretion in striking the strikes as to only some counts, when the reasons stated for doing so applied with equal force to all counts. Respondent, on the other hand, urges that the trial court's ability to strike a strike is limited, and that there is no principled basis for striking strikes as to some counts but not as to other counts in a multi-three strikes case. Respondent thus seeks to increase appellant's sentence to 50 years to life. According to respondent, appellant should receive prison terms of 25 years to life on each of the four counts of which he was convicted, with imposition of terms stayed as to counts 2 and 7 (see Pen.Code, 654), for a total consecutive term on counts 1 and 6 of 50 years to life. (See People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 512-513, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64 (consecutive sentences for crimes not committed on the same occasion and not arising from same operative facts).)

We disagree with both appellant and respondent. The trial court was fully capable of exercising what discretion was left to it after the three strikes law. Assessing the sentencing value of the matter before it, the court stated rational and credible reasons (not challenged on appeal) for striking the strikes as to all but one count. In People v. Garcia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 834, 837-838, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, as modified at 60 Cal.App.4th 1241a, this court observed that neither statutory provisions nor the Romero decision expressly preclude trial courts from striking prior convictions as to some counts only, as opposed to striking priors as to all counts. We adhere to our opinion in Garcia.

Finally, although the trial court acknowledged on the record its duty to enter in the minutes its reasons for striking the strikes, it apparently neglected to do so. The reasons for striking prior convictions in the [63 Cal.App.4th 864] furtherance of justice " ' "must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes." ' " (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 159, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429.) " ' "The statement of reasons is not merely directory, and neither trial nor appellate courts have authority to disregard the requirement. It is not enough that on review the reporter's transcript may show the trial court's motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason 'so that all may know why this great power has been exercised.' " ' " (Ibid.) The trial court is thus directed to enter such a minute order.