In implying the terms in the contract which he did, I am of opinion that Kirby J. was in error. In the first place, the principle in Reigate does not warrant the examination of circumstances arising after the formation of the contract in order to determine whether a term should be implied. It is the negotiations leading to the contract, and the circumstances of those negotiations, taken with the express obligations created by the contract, that are relevant in determining whether both parties would have given the compulsive answer contemplated by Reigate in answering questions raised by silence in the express terms of the contract. The principle of that case is wholly dependent upon factual circumstances, and when they are such that a question arises upon a matter not expressed in the contract, the compulsive answer given by both parties must be an explicit statement of what in fact they would necessarily have agreed upon at the time of formation as a term of the contract on a matter for which no express provision had otherwise been made. I take it from the remarks at p. 315 of his judgment that this was also the view of Laidlaw J.A. The developing circumstances subsequent to the formation of a contract cannot be looked at to determine what answer, if any, the parties might have agreed to give on a question essentially posed during the formation of the contract, although in a proper case they may be resorted to in interpreting the terms of the contract which was in fact made. They were taken into account for this purpose in Hick v. Raymond hereunder discussed.
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