Is the petitioner a mortgagee in possession during the period between October 13, 1995 and July 2, 1996?

In any event, whenever actual default occurred, the evidence does not raise a triable issue as to whether the petitioner was a mortgagee in possession during the period between October 13, 1995 to July 2, 1996. The following passage in Noyes v. Pollock (1886), 32 C.H.D. 53, at p. 64 is apposite. But in the case where an estate is to let to tenants, of course the mortgagee does not enter into actual possession of the demised premises. He may fall under the principle of a person who enters and takes possession of the rents and profits; but only, as it seems to me, if he does something which goes beyond the mere receipt of sums of monies to which the rents and profits may amount, and reaches a point at which he displaces, for the purpose of realizing the security, the mortgagor from the control and dominion of the reversion of the estate which is demised. Unless the dominion and control is taken in that sense, the mere receipt of the product of the management may be taken by the mortgagee, and yet he may stop short of taking the management itself. He may take the rents; that is not enough unless the takes the rents in such a way as to take upon himself, and out of the hands of the mortgagor, the business and duty of collecting and being diligent in that respect.