Is relevance relevant to discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter?

Gonthier J., in Miron v. Trudel, stated that discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter is conclusively rebutted by a finding that the ground on which the equal treatment is denied is relevant to the legislative goal or the functional values underlying the impugned law. McLachlin J. respectfully disagreed and asserted that “… relevance was only one factor in determining whether a distinction on an enumerated or analogous ground is discriminatory in the social and political context of each case” (at p. 201 C.R.R., pp. 741-42 D.L.R.). She added that it was necessary “… to look beyond relevance to ascertain whether the impact of the impugned legislation is to disadvantage the group or individual in a manner which perpetuates the injustice which s. 15(1) is aimed at preventing” (at p. 204 C.R.R., p. 745 D.L.R.).