Does sexual orientation constitute an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter?

In Egan v. Canada, supra, while the court was divided in the result and with respect to certain basic issues of analysis of equality rights, sexual orientation was accepted by all members of the court as an analogous ground of discrimination. La Forest J. found that sexual orientation (at p. 528 S.C.R., p. 90 C.R.R.) “is a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs, and so falls within the ambit of s. 15 protection as being analogous to the enumerated grounds.” Cory J., writing for himself and Iacobucci J. on the point, stated (at p. 599 S.C.R., p. 143 C.R.R.): “The fundamental consideration underlying the analogous grounds analysis is whether the basis of distinction may serve to deny the essential human dignity of the Charter claimant.” Cory J. distanced himself from the “discrete and insular minority” analysis, observing that while this could serve as a useful analytic tool, it was not a prerequisite for finding that the challenged category-did constitute an analogous ground. Adding that (at p. 600 S.C.R., p. 143 C.R.R.) “it may be helpful to see if there is any indication that the group in question has suffered discrimination arising from stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice”, Cory J. found that sexual orientation did constitute an analogous ground.