Does the operative time of registration apply to s. 11 of the Land Titles Act?

Again to accept the proposition that the operative time is the time of registration would appear to make s. 11 of the Act inapplicable. In Lett v. Gettins (supra), Mr. Justice Newlands summarized the interrelation of ss. 7 and 11 of the Act at pp. 617-618, when he said: “This Act was undoubtedly passed for the purpose of preventing a married man from disposing of or morgaging his homestead without the consent of his wife. Where he had no wife, or where the land was not his homestead, evidence of those facts would be necessary before the registrar could register a transfer and to protect a mortgagee. For this reason the affidavit was provided for where there was no signature of his wife to the instrument. The amendment was undoubtedly passed to protect a purchaser or mortgagee who took the instrument relying upon facts stated in the affidavit from the fraud of a married man, and, where the purchaser or mortgagee acted bona fide, the instrument was to become effective without the signature of the wife. “In my opinion the Act never intended to apply to a case when the land in question was not a homestead, or the instrument was made by a man who had no wife. Under our system of registration, evidence of this fact was necessary in order for the registrar to give effect to the instrument by registration just as it is necessary to have an affidavit of execution for the same purpose. The language of the Land Titles Act as to an affidavit of execution is the same that requirement ‘shall be accompanied by an affidavit’. The only effect of the want of an affidavit of execution on an instrument is that it cannot be registered; the instrument is perfectly good for the purposes for which it is made, and can be completed by the swearing of the affidavit at any time.”