Can a reasonable excuse arise on a charge under s. 235(2)?

Further: The contention of the appellant is that a reasonable excuse, ex post facto so to speak, arises on a charge under s. 235(2) if the accused did not in fact have care or control or was not impaired. This contention invites a self-defeating construction of s. 235 and would wipe out the difference, clearly made in ss. 234 and 235, between culpability under the one and under the other. Counsel would have it that a person who cannot be found guilty under s. 234 becomes immune to guilt under s. 235(2), although the requirements for a proper demand for a breath sample have been met. Reasonable excuse, under s. 235(2), refers, in my view, to matters which stand outside of the requirements which must be met (i.e. those under s. 235(1)) before a charge can be supported under s. 235(2). See, for example, Brownridge v. The Queen, 1972 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 926.