The following excerpt is from U.S. v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir. 1987):
"Berrios argues that, even if the district court did not clearly err in finding that she posed a risk of flight, the court nevertheless erred by failing to consider fully and explicitly whether the government had shown that no condition or combination of conditions would 'reasonably assure' her presence at trial if she were released.... Berrios points out that the district court's obligation to consider all possible alternatives to preventive detention derives from the historical view that bail may be denied only in a 'rare case of extreme and unusual circumstances,' [United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1 Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) ], and that the presumption in favor of bail still applies where the defendant is found to be a risk of flight.... Because these legal and policy standards were explicitly incorporated into the [Act] ... the court's determination of the viability of alternatives to detention must be, in every case, a mixed question of fact and law. Such questions are subject to flexible
Page 196
Berrios-Berrios, supra, 791 F.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
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