Is section 47(b) of the California Civil Code (e.g. privacy protection act) applicable to eavesdropping?

In evident conflict with the policy of permitting members of the public to police the spectrum of "unfair competition" is the policy embodied in section 47(b), discussed above, of insuring litigants open access to the courts. Confronted with an apparent conflict between these two statutes, we must harmonize them insofar as possible. (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 488, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.)

The closest precedent in point is our decision in Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d 355, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637. As noted, ante, at p. 832 of 17 Cal.Rptr.2d, p. 1048 of 847 P.2d, there the plaintiff sought damages from a defendant who had eavesdropped on a telephone conversation between plaintiff and his former wife and subsequently testified as to the nature of their conversation; the complaint sought damages for invasion of privacy and related torts as well as damages under Penal Code section 637.2, granting persons injured by eavesdropping a right of action. Defendant contended that her testimony was privileged under section 47(b).