Is evidence of an uncharged crime admissible to prove intent?

a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the charged crimes. [Citation.] Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328.)

"'The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] . . . In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant "'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1328.)

"If evidence of prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to be relevant to prove the defendant's intent . . . , the trial court then must consider whether the probative value of the evidence 'is "substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'Rulings made under [Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352] are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'Under the abuse of discretion standard, "a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a

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manifest miscarriage of justice." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1328-1329.)