Is deterring a qualifying crime under section 2962 of the MDO Act?

threats or violence to deter an officer from performing his or her duties; and second, by resisting an officer by force or violence. (People v. Campbell (20015) 233 Cal.App.4th 148, 160, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 491.) Appellant was charged with, and pled guilty to, both deterring and resisting. To prove that the crime was a qualifying offense, the prosecution offered a copy of the abstract of judgment reflecting appellant's guilty plea conviction along with a copy of the felony complaint alleging, among other things, that appellant had knowingly resisted by the use of force and violence and by means of threats and violence the executive officers in the performance of duty. (Italics added.)

This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant's commitment offense was one in which the prisoner used force or violence as set forth in subdivision (e)(2)(P) of section 2962. In arguing otherwise, appellant notes the court appears to have agreed with the prosecution's assertion that section 69 is a violent offense on its face and that a mere conviction of that crime qualifies a prisoner for treatment under both of the MDO Act's catchall provisions. Although we reject this assertion, we review the legal correctness of the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.)³